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RECENT BOOKS 
THE FEUDAL FRAMEWORK OF 
ENGLISH LAW 
Robert C. Palmer* 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM. By S.F. C. 
Mi/som. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1976. Pp. xi, 
201. $28.50. 
The legal changes during the reign of Henry II (1154-1189) are 
the foundation for the study of Anglo-American legal history; their 
characterization is a major issue in constitutional history. More than 
eighty years ago, F.W. Maitland propounded as the basis for the 
standardized twelfth-century writs a set of decisions to provide pro-
tection to property rights on both a proprietary and possessory level. 1 
Maitland's vision has dominated legal and constitutional thought on 
the subject since then. In The Legal Framework of English Feudal-
ism, S.F.C. Milsom provides a different vision. Where Maitland saw 
property rights to be protected, Milsom sees only contractual obliga-
tions to be enforced. Where Maitland saw purposeful, far-sighted 
innovation, Milsom sees limited innovations magnified by juristic 
accident. His ideas are thus strikingly different; and his book, excep-
tionally important for those interested in legal and constitutional his-
tory or in the early law of property and obligations. Because of the 
book's philosophical component, those who are interested in the de-
velopment of law will find here, although hidden behind the strange 
technicality of late twelfth-century law, a very important contribu-
tion to the conceptualization of legal change. 
• It is therefore regrettable that the book, although carefully writ-
ten, is almost impossible to understand. It is true that with a bit of 
fortitude and some knowledge of Maitland's version of the develop-
ment of the law one can glean some of the general ideas, but the 
weight and complexity of his argument is hidden from those without 
• Postdoctoral Scholar, Michigan Society of Fellows, University of Michigan Law School. 
B.A. 1970, University of Oregon; M.A. 1971, Ph.D. 1977, University of Iowa. - Ed. 
The author has preferred to translate most of the documentary ml;lterial in the notes from 
the original (often abbreviated) Latin for the convenience of a wider audience; as is usual in 
historical work of this period, he retains the responsibility for these translations. 
1. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1895). 
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some experience in working with early writs and, preferably, in read-
ing the early plea rolls. Even one with that experience, however, will 
be plagued by Milsom's style. He has raised allusion, hint, and ob-
scure suggestion to an art. This reader is better prepared than most, 
but there remain points at which Milsom remains determinedly in-
scrutable. Few books, however, so repay diligent attention with such 
insights. 
Milsom's avowed goal is to reconstruct the feudal component of 
English society around 1200. That sounds deceptively simple. The 
book is not really about English society and feudalism around 1200, 
but rather about the process of legal change from the 1180s to the 
1230s. In only 200 pages it sets out the societal practices of English 
feudalism and the way in which they were altered as they were put 
into the abstract form familiar to those who study late medieval Eng-
lish law. Part of this is done merely by hint; many of the most im-
portant events are only briefly summarized; some of the process is 
hidden by elaborate case dissection. The book amounts to an ambi-
tious undertaking and a monumental achievement. If any further 
justification were needed for Milsom's eminence in the field of legal 
history, this would be it: he is still willing to question the basic as-
sumptions of traditional learning. 
Both the difficulty and the novelty of this book necessitate a thor-
ough review. Since it was published in 1976 there have been three 
good reviews. 2 The perplexed reader will find there brief learned 
descriptions of the book. This Review will provide a more extensive 
and technical consideration of Milsom's argument and suggest alter-
natives. The direction of his argument, its implications, and the 
range of opinion it can generate can thus be more accurately ascer-
tained. I do this with some hesitation, because no one has a better 
grasp of medieval legal technicality than the author of the introduc-
tion to Novae Narrationes. But unless the issues are put into active 
historical discussion, the profession will remain nonplussed by Mil-
som's work. 
2. Brand, Book Review, 10 IR. JuR. 363 (1975); Hyams, Book Review, 93 ENG. HIST. Rev. 
856 (1978); White, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 359 (1977). Bruce Lyon's review, 86 
YALE L.J. 782 (1977), will be of interest as a traditional response from a constitutional histo-
rian. His thorough rejection of Milsom has sadly resulted in the relegation of this book to a 
mere mention in a section bibliography of the new edition of his A Constitutional and Legal 
History of Medieval England, making it obsolete at the outset. B. LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 325 (2d ed. 1980). Other reviews ofMilsom's 
book do not profess to add much to historical discussion. As far as I have seen, neither Profes-
sor Thome nor Professor Sutherland has reviewed the book. 
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I 
The Legal Framework of English Feudalism has three themes: 
one philosophical, one polemical, one analytical. The philosophical 
theme is at once the most understated and the most important for 
understanding the book. It consists of two simple principles. The 
first is that juristic accident is a (the?) major component of legal 
change. Legal historians have long pointed to great decisions to ex-
plain legal change. Milsom prefers to find rather more limited deci-
sions that then have results broader than those intended. This 
principle should long ago have become part of the intellectual ap-
proach of legal historians. It demands nothing other than the con-
sideration of men, ideas, and law in their contemporary context, and 
it reduces the occasions at which we have to judge that a person 
transcended his contemporaries and his training to reach out and 
change society. This principle of caution, ultimately historical in ap-
proach, will nevertheless demand more difficult explanations be-
cause it will require historians to explain changes using conceptions 
not their own: the requisite conceptions are those from the other side 
of the legal change. Milsom's kind of history may thus be harder for 
students to understand and less valuable for those whose use of legal 
history is limited to the search for particular precedents, but it is a 
better guide to what actually happened and to the way in which law 
works in society.3 
Milsom's second philosophical principle is more limited: review 
procedures operate to change customary practice into rules of law. 
He spends little time defining what this means, but it is the heart of 
the book. Custom is law that is congruent with popular conceptions 
of how things should be. It can be very certain and can provide 
great security of tenure and of rights. Still, in those situations in 
which the application of the normal practice would produce an unto-
ward result, there is sufficient discretion to produce a result consis-
tent with popular conceptions of justice. Custom is completely 
congruen~ with a popular morality. Law with genuine "rules oflaw" 
is distinctly different from customary law. Since rules of law grow 
out of customary norms, their content will be largely identical. In 
the marginal situations in which custom requires discretion, how-
ever, ;rules oflaw demand strict application, even though the result is 
untoward. Rules of law produce anomalous decisions in fringe 
cases. The mechanism that Milsom observes changing twelfth-cen-
tury custom into rules of law is the supervision of one court by an-
3. See, e.g., pp. 2-3, 177-86. 
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other. That supervision eliminated the discretion necessary to the 
continuance of custom. His argument thus always focuses on super-
vision and the curious situation at the edge of the law, where odd 
things happen. It is that oddity which, precisely because it is not 
congruent with popular justice and past practice, produces novelty, 
either in legal rights or in the production of new laws.4 
The polemical theme of the book is a respectful refutation of 
Maitland; that theme constitutes the overt argument of each chapter. 
Maitland thought that the assize of novel disseisin5 was instituted as 
a possessory protection of freehold property rights. Milsom main-
tains that the assize was instituted to regulate the lord's court's disci-
plining of acknowledged tenants to perform their obligations. This 
assurance of due process by the assize constitutes the review proce-
dure which produced rules of law (chapter 1). 
Maitland thought that the assize of novel disseisin accomplished 
a relatively painless transfer of jurisdiction over disputes concerning 
abstract property rights from one set of impartial courts to another 
parallel set of courts. Milsom maintains that the courts were not par-
allel since the assize was regulatory in nature; that the process was 
far from painless because it involved the rigid application of rules 
made from discretionary custom; that there were no abstract prop-
erty rights to be transferred at that time; and that the lord's courts 
were not impartial but rather immoveably biased ( chapter 2). 
Maitland thought that the writs of entry were provided to fill a 
gap between possessory and proprietary actions. Milsom, after a 
long analysis of the rule that no one need answer for his free tene-
ment unless challenged by writ, concludes that the writs of entry 
grew organically from the untoward consequences of the assize of 
novel disseisin. The assize limited the lord's court, disjointed the ra-
tional allocation of jurisdictions, and necessitated a precipe writ 
which came, because (?) of Magna Carta, to have included in It the 
reason why its issuance was not a violation of a lord's jurisdiction. 
That reason, for Milsom, is that the lord himself was the plaintiff: 
writs of entry were essentially lords' claims against their tenants' 
"downward-looking claims" (chapter 3). 
Maitland pronounced himself unwillingly forced to believe that 
by Bracton's time a lord had little choice about accepting a new ten-
ant as his man. Milsom explores the theoretical background of the 
4. See, e.g., pp. 58-59, 119-21, 177-86. 
5. The assize was a procedure to settle a dispute related to the possession of land. It was 
initiated by purchase of the appropriate writ. For an example of a writ of novel disseisin, see 
note 11 infra. 
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use of subinfeudation and substitution in the lord's court in making 
grants and allowances ofland. He concludes that the lord-man bond 
persisted as a personal relationship in Bracton's time so that the lord 
did not have to accept a new tenant as his man, although he might 
not have been able to pry him loose from the land (chapter 4). 
Over all, Maitland thought that the writ of right and the writ of 
summons (the so-called writ of rightprecipe), the writs of entry, and 
the assizes of novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor had been provided 
to protect property rights and extend royal control. Milsom, on the 
contrary, thinks that the intent behind the writs was much more lim-
ited: it was only an attempt to make the feudal world operate ac-
cording to its own morality and assumptions. The external 
enforcement, however, created rules of law that were the basis of the 
defined estates in land. Instead of the classical, calculating Henry II 
who cleverly undermined the barons by providing limited but faster 
and more efficient protection, Milsom sees a Henry II who believed 
in feudal ethics. The king's originally limited enforcement of those 
beliefs produced anomalies; the legal system grew from progressive 
responses to those anomalies ( chapter 5). 
The book is thus structured around the polemical theme, but wo-
ven into that argument is an analysis of the development of abstract 
rules of law about property right and inheritance in English society. 
While the effects of that change range from the destruction of the 
feudal relationship to the centralization of authority, Milsom does 
not approach these topics straightforwardly. Instead, those themes 
are implicit in his occasional reference to rules of law. By its very 
nature, the change cannot be verified by analyzing the security of 
tenure or the regularity of succession by heirs; both tenure and in-
heritance were fairly secure by custom. Milsom is concerned with a 
relatively small incremental increase in security, which had an im-
mense qualitative effect on the way people viewed their rights. Es-
tablishing the stages of that development, Milsom's third theme, is 
thus necessary, but inevitably it will be more precise in chronology 
than he would like. 
The initial situation was that of the "truly feudal world," charac-
terized by obligations, legal simplicity of title to land, discretion, and 
almost absolute seignorial control. The truly feudal society knew 
nothing of property right, only of mutual obligation. Land was held 
- not owned - in return for services. If the services were not per-
formed, the tenants would be evicted: the land would escheat. If the 
tenant was threatened from outside, it was the lord's obligation -
not the state's - to maintain him. The tenant's right was thus a 
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right against an individual, not a property right good against the 
whole world. The tenant's "title" to the land, if it can be called that, 
flowed only from the lord's acceptance. That acceptance was shown 
by the lord taking the man's homage and then seising him of the 
land. Thereafter they were strictly bound to each other; no normal 
outsider could break that bond. Since that bond was a relationship, 
however, there was always discretion in the initial de.termination of 
who would become the lord's man. The regularity of custom was 
assured by the lord's court, but the court would reject untimely or 
unacceptable heirs as easily as the lord himself. There was thus 
neither an abstract rule of law for inheritance nor an abstract rule of 
law of warranty. Moreover, since right to land was a contractual 
obligation and not ownership, default by the tenant would result in a 
just disseisin. Anything that endangered either the services or the 
feudal incidents - and that "anything" would include defaults of 
service, excessive grants without permission, and unlicensed mar-
riage - would justly result either in forfeiture by the tenant or rejec-
tion of the heir. The lord was decidedly the master of the tenant and 
his land. Obligation, simplicity of title, discretion, and seignorial 
control characterized the truly feudal world, the ground from which 
the common law developed. 
Milsom does not expressly state when this truly feudal world ex-
isted. He does infer its properties, however, from events narrated in 
the early curia regis rolls and from G!anvill6 - roughly, then, from 
the 1180s to the 1230s. He thinks that this was a period of decisive 
change, a time at which the feudal relationship was far from dead. It 
is not an unfair conclusion, then, that he must consider England 
truly feudal prior at least to the late 1170s. That conclusion will 
trouble some historians, not because it is obviously false, but because 
it relies on Milsom's use of the word "feudal." His truly feudal 
world can accommodate customary inheritance and security of ten-
ure; his use of the word is based on the decisive quality of the de)lel-
opment of rules of law and the limitation of customary discretion. 
Many historians have accepted de facto inheritance as antithetical to 
a truly feudal world and may not easily perceive Milsom's distinc-
tions. 
Within the time of that truly feudal world there was an innova-
tion that would have but did not in fact destroy it: the regularization 
6. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED 
GLANVILL (G. Hall ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GLANVILL]. 
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of the writ of right patent. 7 Since the book focuses on the conse-
quences of the assize of novel disseisin - seeing there the mecha-
nism that in fact destroyed the feudal world8 - the regularization of 
the writ of right receives very limited treatment.9 Milsom concurs 
with previous historians in concluding that the writ of right was reg-
ularized shortly after Henry II became King in 1154. Instead of a 
monumental decision, however, he would have it be merely a great 
decision to settle an immediate problem, the impact of which was 
intended to be of short duration. Henry had to reconcile parties who 
were deeply divided during the anarchy of Stephen's reign (1135-
1154), parties who often had forfeited lands for their allegiance to 
King Stephen or to the Empress and Henry. The resolution of con-
flicting claims against lords, of whom Henry himself was one, was to 
be by the application of a neutral standard: the situation as it had 
been at the death of Henry I in 1135. Such a standard favored 
neither party and was thus politically acceptable, but it erected a 
standard of title that was essentially external to the present lord's 
acceptance. As such, it threatened the very basis of the lord's discre-
tion in selecting his tenants. 
Milsom believes that the writ of right patent in fact had a very 
modest impact on the lord's court. In a truly feudal society, a lord 
would simply ignore an outside claimant to a tenement already occu-
pied. That studied partiality toward the accepted tenant was the 
lord's obligation to his man; it was his warranty. It required an 
outside force even to bring the claim into litigation: a writ. As a 
brute statement of fact, then, no one had to answer for his free tene-
ment if the claimant did not have a writ. That writ, however, did not 
alter what would happen in the lord's court. The court would surely 
default still, in obedience to its obligation to the tenant. The writ 
7. The following is a writ of right patent from between 1155 to 1189 clearly patterned in an 
"upward-looking" orientation, that is, the claimant is merely claiming to hold of the lord: 
Henry king of the English . . . to the prior of Bromholm, greetings. I order that you hold 
full right without delay to Simon of Ludham concerning three shillings worth [annually] 
of land in W estwick which he claims to hold from your church. And if you do not, the 
sheriff of Norfolk will. Witness: Simon fitz Peter at Northampton. 
ST. BENET OF HOLM, 1020-1210, at 27 (J. West ed. 1932) (Norfolk Rec. Socy., Pub. No. 2) 
(Writ No. 50). 
8. Some historians find it repugnant to say that a writ could destroy the feudal world. See, 
e.g., White, supra note 2, at 364. Such a statement is quite sensible, however. One cannot -
and I would think that Milsom does not - isolate the piece of parchment from the legal 
process, the legal process from the royal servants, the royal servants from the increased royal 
authority and power, and that authority and power from the economic structure that made it 
possible. Reference to the writ is a quick and accurate means of referring to the direction in 
which all these things are brought to bear in a regular manner; a set of writs can thus obviously 
change society. 
9. Pp. 177-79. 
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would serve only to notify the lord of the new claimant and permit 
removal of the case into the county court. There or in the king's 
court right would be done against the lord and the sitting tenant. 
The writ of right, therefore, did not radically change process in the 
lord's court. Moreover, Milsom claims that the king's court would 
even require the lord's court to default: that was part of the tenant's 
customary due process.10 
The destruction of the truly feudal world was accomplished not 
by the writ of right patent but by the assize of novel disseisin; 11 we 
may say it inaugurated the time of change. The assize, like the writ 
patent, was grounded in a very modest intention: to require lords to 
give their accepted tenants process customarily due. That would 
have seemed no large change; few people would have liked to have 
been seen arguing that they could violate popular ideas of justice, 
that they should have the option of being injust. The problems that 
arose in the assize derived from the strict feudal conceptions by 
which it was originally molded. "Having been seised" had meant 
that one was accepted by the lord; the assize thus determined that all 
who had been seised should be accorded customary due process, and 
could not be disseised except justly and by judgment. 
The anomaly that caused the development of rules of law con-
cerned those who had been seised but who had not been accepted 
and had no claim to be accepted by the present lord. One such mar-
ginal case was that of the Countess Amice. 12 Her husband had 
seised a tenant of some of her land prior to their divorce. After the 
divorce, the tenant could claim to have been validly seised, although 
he had no claim against the countess herself. In a truly feudal world, 
the countess would have examined his claim and ejected him: he 
had no claim against her. By 1200, however, the brute statement of 
10. This last assertion is made amid a flurry of questions and reiterations of the word 
"perhaps." See p. 64. 
11. The best and earliest form of the writ of novel disseisin is contained in GLANVILL, 
supra note 6, at 167: 
The king to the sheriff, greetings. N. has complained to me that R. unjustly and without a 
judgment has disseised him of his free tenement in such-and-such a vill since my last 
voyage to Normandy. Therefore I co=and you that, ifN. gives you security for prose-
cuting his claim, you are to see that the chattels which were taken from the tenement are 
restored to it, and that the tenement and the chattels remain in peace until the Sunday 
after Easter. And meanwhile you are to see that the tenement is viewed by twelve free 
and lawful men of the neighbourhood, and their names endorsed on this writ. And sum-
mon them by good su=oners to be before me or my justices on the Sunday after Easter, 
ready to make the recognition. And su=on R., or his bailiff if he himself cannot be 
found, on the security of gage and reliable sureties to be there then to hear the recogni-
tion. And have there the su=oners, and this writ and the names of the sureties. Wit-
ness, etc. 
12. Pp. 45-47. This is the single most important case in Milsom's analysis; to a large extent 
it is his thesis in a nutshell. 
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fact that a tenant need not answer a claimant without a writ had 
been turned into an abstract rule of law. It was now turned around 
and applied not only against outsiders, but also against lords. 13 Cus-
tom would never have brought that about. Thus when the countess 
turned the tenant out and the tenant brought the assize against her, 
the king's court required her to have a writ to challenge the tenant. 
By further irony, however, no writ was available that would bring 
the challenge to her court:14 the writ had to be addressed to her lord. 
The case inevitably wound up in the king's court - or would have, 
had it been brought - where a downward claim by the lord was 
expressed in a special mise to the grand assize. 15 That special mise 
was gradually separated out into matter for a special recognition; the 
special recognition by further evolution was later incorporated into 
the original writ. The product was a writ of entry. The countess 
would have obtained a writ of entry cui ante divorcium 16 had her case 
not arisen before such writs were available. The assize of novel dis-
seisin thus produced a distortion that separated "being seised" from 
the active acceptance of the lord; it focused on what had been the all 
13. Milsom does not express the point this clearly, but it must be what he means. His 
failure to enunciate it like this does not destroy his thesis, but it does leave some serious 
problems. If the rule was originally a well-known custom applied only against outsiders and 
not against lords, and if the feudal world was still very much alive at the time of the Countess 
Amiee case, one wonders how the justices ever even considered the rule to apply against lords. 
One would have thought several steps and some passage of time - longer at least than a 
decade - after the assize had come to produce odd consequences would have been required. 
This twist should have been stated explicitly in the book; it is one of the points at which 
readers are likely to lose their way. 
14. This is an odd implication that Milsom simply asserts as fact. Why should there have 
been no writ which would bring the case into the countess' court? We cannot assume that the 
writ forms the chancery could issue had already been restricted; indeed, one can imagine a 
form in that such a writ might have issued: ''The king to countess Amiee, greetings. You are 
to hold justly and in peace all that land you had prior to your marriage to the earl of Clare and 
which you received by inheritance during that marriage free from any claims which might be 
made against you from the time of that marriage, which has been lawfully dissolved, saving, 
however, the right of those who may wish to bring my writ." It is interesting that such writs 
were not issued. The anomaly of the rule was becoming known. Lords certainly felt they 
could handle such things in their courts. There is an implication of great formalism and lack 
of imagination. A better explanation would be desirable. 
15. The grand assize was a panel of twelve knights called upon to answer who had the 
greater right to the land as between the two parties. The question stated in that way was a 
general mise. It could also be stated as a special mise, as "does claimant have greater right to 
hold in demesne than tenant to hold of him." P. 7 n.4. 
16. The form of the writ cui in vita was as follows: 
The king to the sheriff, greetings. Command B. that justly and without delay he render to 
A. ten acres of land with appurtenances in N. which she claims to be her right and her 
inheritance into which he has no entry save through R., formerly her husband, who gave 
them to him whom in his lifetime she could not oppose. 
EARLY REGISTER OF WRITS 10 (E. Haas & G. Hall eds. 1970) (Selden Secy. Pub. No. 87) (Hib. 
26) (form slightly altered). The cui ante divorcium, the writ appropriate to the Countess Amiee 
case, does not appear in the registers until the fourteenth century, although it was known at 
least as early as the reign of Edward I. 
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important proprietary moment at the beginning of the relationship, 
thus leaving out the relational content of "having been seised." The 
produce was seisin, a property right increasingly good against the 
whole world and increasingly independent of the lord. By juristic 
accident, the assize came to protect possession; the intent behind it 
had only been to enforce due process. Property right thus emerged 
from the regulation of feudal mutual obligations. 
The assize increasingly prohibited lords from inquiring, as the 
Countess Amiee had at first, into the tenant's title; the king's court 
thus took over the protection of all those claims against lords that 
had customarily been honored and renewed in the lord's court. Thus 
gifts to younger sons, marriage portions, and reasonable grants to 
third parties were all maintained by the king's court because lords 
now found it too dangerous to determine such things in their own 
courts. At first, the king's court used the grand assize with a special 
mise, but an assize of knights of the county was not the lord's court 
and could not exercise precisely the same discretion as could the 
lord. Anyway, that discretion operated in situations often difficult to 
form into rules of law - discretion was concerned, after all, with 
reasonableness - and such concerns were shunted out of the realm 
of consideration by the justices into consideration by the grand as-
size: who has more right? Warranty, however, was clear and cus-
tomary and was enforced rigidly. Discretion was amorphous and 
was first concealed and then, finally, eliminated. Maritagia and al-
lowances to younger sons, customarily honored, came to be enforced 
rigidly by the king's court. They thus became virtually indistin-
guishable from other grants and therefore much more secure. 
Grants themselves came to be so well protected that the lord's con-
trol over his tenant's services and the feudal incidents ultimately 
came into doubt. This was the beginning of the age of ownership. 
The discretion of the lord as to his acceptance of the tenant was 
limited by the writ patent, by the assize of novel disseisin, and by the 
assize of mort d'ancestor. By the enforcement of customary succes-
sion, the law was investing the heir with an indefeasible right. By 
the same process - application of the customary strict obligation of 
the lord to maintain his man - it was fixing on the heir the burden 
of his father's obligations. On the one hand, then, the heir gained an 
abstract right of inheritance good against the world; on the other 
hand, he was subjected to a strict obligation of warranty, now with 
no ameliorating discretion. Out of this grew a power to alienate both 
by subinf eudation and by substitution, a power that had previously 
been limited by the lord's control and by the heir's discretion. Only 
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as that process continued did the lord's concern about his power to 
restrict his tenant's alienation and to control the feudal incidents be-
gin to surface in legal considerations. Prior to the thirteenth century, 
control had been so firm that the lord required no protection. Writs 
had produced rules of law; rules of law had produced abstract prop-
erty rights. Those rights vitiated the lord's power and destroyed the 
feudal world. No one, however, had intended that to happen. 
Henry II had only wanted to make the feudal world operate accord-
ing to its own morality and its own assumptions. 
II 
This framework, although it has its own weaknesses, is a priori 
more believable than Maitland's. It is impressive in that it relates 
the development of the law to popular morality and the decisions of 
normally intelligent men reacting to particular problems. Moreover, 
it has the attractiveness both of careful documentation and of great 
conceptual unity. On the other hand, however, it is a study of partic-
ular sources from a very limited time frame - ca. 1189-1230. That 
study purports to have broad implications for the next previous age. 
As Maitland himself discovered, there is seldom a more dangerous 
- or courageous - task for the historian than hypothesizing from 
one's documents what the next previous age must have been like. 
There can be no doubt that Milsom's thesis contains a large measure 
of truth. Indeed, as between Maitland and Milsom, we must choose 
Milsom. But it may be that we should not accept either completely. 
In what remains of this review essay, I shall present an alterna-
tive hypothesis, one which grew from a consideration of specific ob-
jections to Milsom's thesis. This is a rather unusual task for a 
review, but it will be useful. At the lowest level, it will delineate 
what is at stake in the various parts of Milsom's argument and thus 
aid the reader in understanding a very difficult work. Moreover, it 
will treat the major objections to Milsom's thesis in a rational order. 
That should provoke some much needed discussion on the topic. Le-
gal Framework, after all, does not seem the kind of book written to 
end discussion. My hypothesis will provide one of the possible con-
ceptual frameworks that can preserve Milsom's insights while ac-
counting for specific difficulties with his thesis. Otherwise it might 
seem that we must simply reject Milsom's work, and that would be a 
grave mistake. Finally, even though this hypothesis is not the prod-
uct of exhaustive research, it is quite possible that it is correct. If it is 
correct, it is fitting for it to appear in a review of Legal Framework, 
because the two should be read together. 
April 1981) Milsom's Legal Framework 1141 
The contention here is that England was not as feudal in 1200 as 
Milsom maintains. He argues that the assize of novel disseisin and 
its untoward consequences imparted a form of property right in the 
decades around 1200, thus decisively changing the feudal world. On 
the contrary, the change began earlier with the compromise of 1153 
and the circumstances surrounding the succession of Henry IL Tolt 
process prior to 1153 will suggest that the enforcement of the tenurial 
aspects of the compromise created a distinction between seisin and 
right. That distinction indicates a title other than the mere accept-
ance of the lord and thus a world not entirely feudal. The assize of 
novel disseisin was indeed a large part of this, but it was operating 
long prior to 1200. The slow growth of property right made possible 
the writs of entry, which, while they retain a seignorial aspect, em-
bodied also some new ideas of ownership. Moreover, those new 
ideas were seemingly not completely excluded from the lord's court, 
which, while irrevocably biased in favor of the accepted tenant, was 
not necessarily unjust to the outside claimant. In all this, much of 
Milsom's argument must be maintained; the processes that he de-
scribes certainly strengthened concepts of property. But although 
the development of the common law was not the far-sighted and 
planned achievement of the Angevins, neither was it a complete ac-
cident. 
Milsom implies that, prior to the reign of Henry II, the lord's 
court was free from any regular outside influence. It is, however, 
accepted historical opinion that the process of tolt intervened in the 
lord's court even early in the reign of Henry I (1100-1135). Tolt pro-
cess allowed a claimant to remove the case from the lord's court into 
the county court after proof of default of right. Either Milsom or 
current opinion must be wrong, but Milsom does not treat the prob-
lem. As it happens, Milsom is probably correct, but the required 
modifications to our conceptions of tolt will be significant for his the-
sis. 
There is indeed much evidence of tolt process prior to 1154. 17 I 
have seen no evidence, however, that tolt would ever have been used 
- at least any more than very exceptionally - in a situation in 
which the lord was presented with a claim for a tenement for which 
17. See 2 REG ESTA REGUM ANGLO-NORMANNORUM, 1066-1154, at 99, 103-04 (C. Johnson 
& H. Cronne eds. 1956) (Nos. 975, 997) (and the account in D. STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE 
BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUJtsT AND THE GREAT CHARTER, 1066-1215, at 138-39 (1964) 
(year 1111)); 2 id. at 212, 274 (Nos. 1516, 1824) (late Henry I); 3 id. at 135, 92, 50, 323 (Nos. 
353-54, 257, 133, 885-86) (Stephen before.1139); 3"id. at 79, 94,358, 176, 73, 32, 77, 85,265, 81, 
8 (Nos. 220, 264-65, 967,472, 201, 84, 212, 239c, 719, 228, 22) (Stephen possibly as late as I 140 
or later). 
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he already had an accepted tenant. All the evidence fits with the 
hypothesis that tolt was appropriate when the tenant had been dis-
seised (for disciplinary reasons) or when the lord held the land after 
the death of a tenant. Such an outside supervision of the lord's court 
by the sheriff and county court would have been regular, but it 
would have interfered in only the uncomplicated situations. To reg-
ulate a lord to do justice to his accepted tenant or to accept the heir 
would not require the lord, at the same time, to break a bond with 
another tenant. Moreover, since the county court was dominated by 
the lords of the county, it is unlikely that its judgment would deprive 
the lord of the discretion Milsom presumes. Until a more detailed 
study demonstrates the contrary - and I rather doubt that it will -
tolt procedure prior to the reign of Henry II will not form the basis 
for defeating Milsom's depiction of an immoveably biased lord's 
court. 
If tolt did not operate prior to 1153 to force a lord to reject an 
accepted tenant in favor of an outsider, even greater caution is re-
quired in interpreting the compromise of I 153. The two accounts of 
the tenurial aspect of the compromise are unofficial, but both indi-
cate an undertaking to restore tenurial relations using the reign of 
Henry I as a standard. 18 Historians thus far have concluded either 
that the tenurial compromise was ignored in fact or that accepted 
tenants were ejected in favor of outside hereditary claimants.19 That 
now seems unlikely. An alternative hypothesis will suggest a ra-
tional origin of the distinction between seisin and right, a distinction 
that one reviewer has already noted was being made early in the 
18. See 4 CHRONICLES OF THE REIGNS OF STEPHEN, HENRY II., AND RICHARD I., THE 
CHRONICLES OF ROBERT OF TORIGNI, ABBOT OF THE MONASTERY OF ST. MICHAEL·IN•PERIL· 
OF-THE-SEA 177 (R. Howlett ed. 1889) (Pub. No. 82 in RERUM BRITANNICARUM MEDII AEVI 
SCRIPTORES); R. DAVIS, KING STEPHEN, I 135-1154, at 122 (1967) (translation slightly modi-
fied: "It was also sworn that possessions which had been snatched away by intruders would be 
recalled to the ancient and legitimate possessors whose they were in the time of the excellent 
King Henry [I]."); GESTA STEPHANI 241 (2d ed. K. Potter trans. 1976) (translation slightly 
modified: "So it was provided and firmly established that, arms having been completely laid 
down, peace should be restored everywhere in the kingdom, the new castles should be demol-
ished, the disinherited should be recalled to their own, the rights and laws commanded to all 
according to pristine custom."). 
19. Davis thought that evictions were impractical and that the tenurial compromise of 1153 
finally resulted only in compromises. R. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 122-25. John T. Appleby 
thinks the provision was purposely eliminated from the treaty. J. APPLEBY, THE TROUBLED 
REIGN OF KING STEPHEN 197 (1969). It should be noted, however, that Stephen's son was a 
beneficiary in the treaty through a closely related provision. See 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGLO· 
NoRMANNORUM, 1066-1154, supra note 17, at 97-99 (No. 272) (''Treaty between King Stephen 
and Duke Henry"); P. HYAMS, KINGS, LORDS AND PEASANTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND THE 
COMMON LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 251-52 (1980), 
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reign of Henry 11.20 Milsom has not inquired deeply into the early 
part of Henry's reign; but, if his ideas are taken seriously, such an 
inquiry is necessary. 
The compromise was conditioned necessarily by both feudal mo-
rality and political necessity. The evidence available suggests that 
the rejection of an accepted tenant was not something Henry II 
would ask. It would undermine the lordship upon which he himself 
relied, and it would cause disorder in the kingdom. He had, after all, 
come into England by compromise, not by conquest. His position 
would not be advanced by large-scale evictions of important people. 
Nor would he have wanted to undermine lordship by eliminating 
feudal discretion in the formation of the lord/man bond. It would 
thus seem improbable for them to have decided to treat the situation 
under Henry I as a rigid guideline for settlement of claims. 
The tenurial compromise of 1153 must have been that the situa-
tion as of I 135 would constitute an important criterion in settling 
disputes. It would not have been formulated in such words, but an 
express reservation of the lord's normal discretion would have been 
ludicrous. The precise application would vary by the nature of the 
dispute. In the simple situation, that of mere encroachments, 1135 
would serve as an absolute standard. The encroacher had no protec-
tion and the proper claimant would merely be reinstated.21 The 
righting of blatant encroachments could hardly have been the main 
substance of the compromise, however, because that would have 
been expected of any king. 
The accounts of the compromise refer to the disinherited. Since 
Henry's side had been most active in disinheriting, a restoration of 
lands would mean that Henry would be evicting his most loyal fol-
lowers: an improbable course of action. One more likely avenue of 
compromise, however, would be for Henry to honor claims of the 
disinherited to those lands which had not been granted out again by 
using the standard of 1135. Past support of King Stephen would no 
longer be regarded as a disqualification: Henry now had little reason 
to undermine staunch support of a crowned king. Use of 1135 as a 
20. See Brand, supra note 2, at 366. 
21. Early examples of the remedy of encroachments by the standard of the compromise 
can be found in regard to the church of Ranworth and the bishopric of Salisbury. See ST. 
BENET OF HOLME, 1020-1210, supra note 7, at 17 (Writ No. 23) (Ranworth); A. SALTMAN, 
THEOBALD, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY 465-66 (1956) (Charter No. 241) (year 1157) (Salis-
bury). Another example appears in G!anvi/1 and was of greater effect: the writ for establishing 
the rightful boundaries between townships. See GLANVILL, supra note 6, at I 16 (Writ No. IX, 
14). The writ apparently envisages the parties as lords and speaks of occupation made unjustly 
and without a judgment to be remedied by restoration to the situation as it had been in the 
time of Henry I. 
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criterion, however, would not have meant that he was obliged to ac-
cept or maintain current enemies. The choice of tenant could not 
have been automatic; the claimant had to be loyal and give promise 
of being loyal in the future. Henry did not abandon discretion; he 
merely agreed to overlook what had happened between 1135 and 
1153. Henry's studied ignorance of Stephen's reign was thus a boon 
to Stephen's supporters. Henry agreed to forget past injuries and 
look back to the time when the claimant's ancestors would last have 
been loyal. 
It is also possible that the compromise extended to lands that had 
been granted out again. The principles of lordship would require 
that the currently accepted tenant be maintained, while the compro-
mise would insist that the disinherited be recalled to their own. The 
obvious method of applying the compromise would be to allow the 
current tenant to live out his tenure without ejection. At the tenant's 
death, however, the lord would have to decide, as alw~ys, on a new 
tenant. The compromise would dictate that the. deceased tenant's 
heir be overlooked and the claimant alleging ancestral possession in 
1135 accepted - if he was acceptable to the lord. That application 
of the compromise would have been a piece of consummate good 
judgment. 
Such a settlement would maximize compromise, provoke the 
least litigation, and spread what litigation there was over a relatively 
long period of time. The tenant would be motivated to compromise 
to ensure some position for his heir. The claimant would want to 
compromise so that his gain would not be indefinitely postponed. 
The lord himself would pressure the parties to compromise. If he let 
the situation reach litigation at the tenant's death, he would be 
forced to reject the good and loyal heir of a good and faithful tenant. 
He would thus appear a faithless lord. But likewise he knew that the 
claimant would someday be his man; it would be impolitic to ignore 
him until that fateful day. It would be much better for all three par-
ties if claimant and tenant could compromise by intermarriage or if 
one could buy the other's right. If necessary, of course, the lord him-
self had heiresses at his disposal; he would lose nothing by bestowing 
one either on the tenant's heir or on the claimant to settle the matter 
before it matured in embarrassing litigation. Litigation would be in-
frequent. What little litigation there was would neither destroy the 
peace of the kingdom nor overtax the judicial structure. 
Such a hypothesis is logical, but it suggests an extremely odd sit-
uation. The tenant was on the land and accepted by the lord. He 
had all the title which a feudal world knew. But at the same time, 
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there was an outsider, not accepted by the lord, who had some kind 
of claim bolstered by a royal undertaking. It was a right founded in 
the past - 1135 to be precise - but in the nature of an expectation. 
It could be enforced only at the current tenant's death. One person 
had seisin, the other, right. 
If no compromise was made, the tenant's death would produce a 
very painful situation. The claimant would present himself, asking 
to be seised. The tenant's heir would also present himself; he would 
be known to the court and would have a clear customary claim. 
Could the lord have simply dismissed the tenant's heir? After all, the 
lord had not been a party to the compromise of 1153. To bring the 
consequences of that compromise to bear, it is likely that the claim-
ant would need a royal writ. Such outside interference would allow 
the lord to disclaim responsibility and retain his reputation. 
If the lord accepted the tenant's heir - either precipitously or 
after careful thought - the claimant would challenge a sitting tenant 
- but a newly seised tenant - and put a lord's position in jeopardy. 
This threat may account for one development in the writ of right. In 
its earliest forms the writ makes no mention of the tenant; it consists 
entirely of an order to the lord to hold full right to the claimant. It 
was at that time that the formal count would have been worked out, 
the count which largely ignores the tenant. But around 1170 the writ 
was altered to make mention of the tenant as deforciant.22 There 
was now some relationship between tenant and claimant, although 
less relationship than either had to the lord. The tenant's heir had 
stayed on the land, asserted his hereditary claim, and put the lord in 
a position in which the lord had to choose between seising an out-
sider or maintaining the heir. The altered writ was thus good against 
a tenant's heir who happened to be in and refused to leave as well as 
against a tenant's heir who had been accepted. Against neither 
would the lord have acted on his own. It would be in this way that 
the law first started to act to bring lords to eject an accepted tenant 
and still to feel that they had to make escambium (compensation). 
It is in such a context that one should consider the origins of the 
assize of novel disseisin. In the early years of the reign of Henry II, 
seisin - the lord's acceptance embodied - was title; it was but 
slightly modified by the interest embodied in the writ of right. A 
claimant faced by a recalcitrant tenant might well be tempted to dis-
22. See ST. BENET OF HOLME, 1020-1210, supra note 7, at 21 (Writ No. 34) (probably 
1163-1166). Van Caenegam suggests that the addition of the deforciant clause came no later 
than 1170. R. VAN CAENEGAM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO 
GLANVILL 212 (1959). 
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seise the tenant immediately instead of waiting for his right to ma-
ture at the tenant's death. A lord might not act swiftly and surely to 
restore the tenant when the claimant was certain to be his man soon. 
Moreover, the lord might himself grow impatient and finally ignore 
the recalcitrant tenant who refused all compromise. It was in this 
context that the tenant's seisin was endangered, both by the lord and 
by the outside claimant. The assize of novel disseisin was a protec-
tion against both, not, as Milsom suggests, only against the lord. His 
suggestion is therefore not convincing,23 but his criticism of 
Maitland is devastating. This analysis incorporates Milsom's in-
sights, but allows a more traditional structure. To be successful, the 
compromise of 1153 would have to protect accepted tenants from 
disseisin by lords or by outsiders. It would be an assurance that the 
expectation did not extinguish the title of seisin. 
Accounts of cases lend some support to this interpretation of the 
compromise of 1153. The church of Marcham had been the subject 
of a complicated settlement between a steward of King Henry I 
(1100-1135) and Abingdon Abbey late in Henry's reign.24 After the 
death of Henry I and during the war that produced the compromise, 
the steward's descendants found themselves unable to render the 
farm (rent) required for the manor they had received in exchange for 
Marcham, so that the manor was forfeited. The steward's son, Tur-
stin, thus tried to reverse the whole settlement, claiming that the ab-
bey, his lord, had fraudulently invaded Marcham. Although he had 
been a supporter of the empress and Henry II, Turstin received, ac-
cording to the compromise of 1153, the executive assistance of King 
Stephen in being returned to possession of Marcham. He thus en-
tered the land "as if the king were ordering and giving judgment."25 
The king had thus interfered when the claimant alleged that his lord 
had disseised him unjustly and without judgment - by fraudulent 
invasion. 
When Henry II succeeded to the throne, the abbey sought his 
23. See text at notes 35-37 infta. 
24. The steward had made a hereditary claim to land which had been held only for life by 
one who had entered the abbey and quitclaimed the land to the abbey. Since the claim was 
made during an abbatial vacancy, the king's support was decisive and the steward was seised 
of the land. When a new abbot was elected, the steward compromised, quitclaiming Marcham 
to the abbey. The abbey in return confirmed him in other lands and gave him the manor at a 
farm (rent) of £15, with the provision that default on the farm would result in automatic rever-
sion without any contradiction. The steward put his daughter into the manor, the manor con-
stituting the endowment of her marriage with the heir of a former claimant to the manor. It 
was apparently the war that devastated the manor, resulting in the default. 
25. Stephen issued two writs, one to the abbot and later one to the sheriff of Berkshire. 
The latter ordered the sheriff to treat the case according to "royal law." No trial is mentioned. 
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assistance against its tenant. The writs spoke of disseisin unjustly 
and without judgment, but here it was the tenant disseising the lord. 
This was not, of course, a case of novel disseisin, 26 but it is a precur-
sor of the Countess Amiee case, because the lord needed the king's 
writ to proceed against his tenant: the tenancy had been royally as-
sured by King Stephen and had been settled by that king according 
to the compromise of 1153. This is just one of the situations in which 
a tenant did not have to answer to his lord without a writ.27 King 
Henry eventually had to settle the case himself.28 True to the spirit 
of the compromise, he not only returned the abbey to its possession 
of Marcham, but he also attempted to restore the manor's farm to 
the steward's descendants to regain the status quo of 1135.29 This is 
an excellent example of the war-related cases around 1154 and of the 
outside influence which was altering the lord/man relationship. 
The Chadd!eworth case, also involving Abingdon Abbey, shows a 
different aspect of the compromise. Here the grandson of Ralf Bas-
set, the famous justice of Henry I, attempted to reverse a grant made 
by Basset in expectation of his death and with the consent of his 
heirs. The claimant prepared his case at the time of the succession of 
Henry II. He must have been hoping that the abbey would buy off 
his claim, because it was very weak;30 but the abbot instead obtained 
26. The period mentioned was 1135; the writ is not in the form of the writ of novel dis-
seisin; the case was to be heard in the abbot's court if that court had not defaulted. 
27. Those who had been put in by royal order might be numerous, since one would have to 
include both those put in by order of a royal court as well as those put in judicially while the 
lord was in wardship to the king. A further class of people against whom a lord might not be 
able to proceed were those whom the king had granted the privilege of not being impleaded 
except by his order or before himself or his justices. See 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGL0-
NoRMANNORUM, 1066-1154, supra note 17, at 3, 78, 198,225,252,319,325, 363 (Nos. 10,215, 
536, 610, 680, 871, 892-93, 983); R0TULI DE OBLATIS ET FINIBUS IN TURRI L0NDINENSI As-
SERVATI, TEMP0RI REGIS J0HANNIS 28, 52, 67 (bis), 86, 176, 189, 243, 247, 256, 303, 438 (T. 
Hardy ed. 1835) [hereinafter cited as RoTULI DE OBLATIS]. A third class might be those whose 
tenancy had been confirmed by the king. See 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGL0-N0RMANN0RUM, 
1066-1154, supra note 17, at 148 (No. 386) ("teneant de quocumque tenehant, et non mittantur in 
placitum .•. sicut tenehant"); 15 (No. 43); 16 (No. 44); 332 (No. 912) ("concessisse et con-
.firmasse . . . omnia tenementa . . . de quocumque ilia teneret"). A fourth class would be those 
tenants who were more powerful than their lords. A lord might thus have other motivations 
than merely his warranty obligation in refusing to listen to outsiders. 
28. King Henry II delegated the Marcham matter to his justices, who ultimately decided to 
let Henry decide it himself so that the decision would be more firm. Of course, the king's 
participation would make any decision more firm; the reasoning must have been that the case 
was a reversal of Stephen's order in a matter of implementation of the compromise of 1153. 
29. The whole case and the writs are given in 2 CHR0NIC0N M0NASTERII DE ABINGDON 
166-68, 183-89, 222-23 (J. Stevenson ed. 1858) (RERUM BRITANNICARUM MEDII AEVI 
SCRIPT0RES) (Rolls Series). See 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGL0-N0RMANN0RUM 1066-1154, 
supra note 17, at 1, 4 (Nos. 3, 13). 
30. The grant had been confirmed by the heirs, and the claimant could not allege his 
grandfather's seisin in 1135 - the crucial year - but only at some time in the reign of Henry 
I. 
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from Henry II a confirmation of the abbey's tenancy as it had held in 
1135. The confirmation also included a prohibition against implead-
ing the abbey unjustly. The claimant was thus put in dangerous 
straits, since he had already begun his plea. He was forced to capitu-
late and make out a chirograph in favor of the abbey.31 The com-
promise of 1153 went as much to assuring tenants as to helping 
claimants. 
The Stisted case is somewhat less clear, but it, like the Marcham 
case, shows the lord - here, Canterbury Cathedral - in need of 
royal help against a tenant. A son of a life tenant had "invaded" the 
manor after the death of Henry I and managed to hold it until he 
himself died. Archbishop Theobald had then restored the manor to 
the cathedral, granting it at farm to Matilda de St-Saens for life. 
Why the litigation began is uncertain, but either the invader's 
brother or Matilda or her heirs precipitated the problem, because the 
archbishop had to obtain a writ from Henry 11.32 The writ spoke of 
disseisin done unjustly and without judgment after the death of 
Henry I, that is, it was a downward-looking claim based on the com-
promise of 1153. Disseisin language is used not because the cathe-
dral's lord - the king - had misused his disciplinary jurisdiction, 
but because a person considered an outsider had taken the land. 
Disseisin by an outsider could obviously result in a claim against the 
lord: it was the lord's duty to put the tenant back in. That claim, 
particularly if the lord was the king, could sound very much like 
allegations of novel disseisin. In this situation, however, the lan-
guage indicates that the compromise of 1153 had been applied to 
undo some successions not assented to by the cathedral and thus 
considered an intrusion during Stephen's reign. 
The most difficult case - translated in full in the note33 - arose 
31. 2 CHRONICON MONASTERII DE ABINGDON, supra note 29, at 170-71, 189-90, 225. 
32. Matilda's tenancy had been confirmed by King Stephen. Either that or perhaps some 
difficulty the cathedral had in exercising authority in Essex made the writ necessary. See A. 
SALTMAN, supra note 21, at 271-72 (Charter No. 44) (years 1154-1160), 
33. By order of our lord King Henry it has been determined by judgment of our court in 
this manner. For when the said Peter demanded the seisin of the aforementioned land 
because his father, as he said, had possessed it on the day on which King Henry I died and 
thereafter his mother had had the same possession until she was violently ejected, no 
mention, however, being made of heredity or of fee, and when the canons would "infect" 
his paternal and maternal possession from which succession would be owed to him or 
another, Peter neither indeed produced instruments or witnesses nor had any other proof 
at all nor would promise any in the future, the court judged that he ought not further seek 
seisin. And because Peter had fatigued them already for three years and had always 
failed in proof, the canons are absolved from the petition of seisin which he would have 
had had he had proofs, saving, however, the question of right (juris) if Peter believed it 
should be instituted. 
Id at 389-90 (Charter No. 167) (years 1154-1161). 
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between 1154 and 1161 and shows that, even early in the reign of 
Henry II, there was a distinction between seisin and right, between 
seisina and jus. The distinction was not one between possession and 
ownership; in that much of Milsom's prediction about this earlier 
time is correct. The claim was based on hereditary seisin in 1135 of 
land which had later been lost by a violent ejection in Stephen's 
reign. The case is clearly not novel disseisin;34 the claimant was 
merely making a petition for seisin, making use also of a royal writ. 
He wanted to fill an opening, and he thought he was entitled to fill 
that place by the terms of the compromise of 1153. Nevertheless, the 
lords - here, the monks - rejected his writ-enforced petition, spe-
cifically leaving him free to claim his jus. That new claim would be 
more serious, since the lord had now rejected this claimant and 
would probably proceed to accept someone else. The claimant's new 
writ would probably look little different from his first, except that it 
would now have a nisi feceris clause so that the case could be re-
moved into county court. But the whole affair would be different. 
The claimant might indeed have jus; and, since his petition for seisin 
had been rejected, that royally assured but lordly rejected expecta-
tion could now force the lord in a new plea to reject its newly ac-
cepted tenant. Claimant and lord were now in an adversary 
relationship, and the case could go to battle. Here, then, is a prop-
erty right distinct from the lord's acceptance well before the assize of 
novel disseisin could work the havoc which Milsom argues produced 
property right by accident. It was, on the contrary, the compromise 
of 1153 early in the reign of Henry II, not the assize of novel dis-
seisin around 1200, which began to vest in tenants the germ of own-
ership by way of a royally assured claim. 
III 
If the nature of the compromise of 1153 was as suggested above, 
the nature and origins of the assize of novel disseisin are different 
than proposed by Milsom. He argues that the intent behind the as-
size was solely regulatory, because anything else would suppose a 
property right being protected and thus a society not thoroughly feu-
dal. Investigation of the origins and purposes of the assize will show 
that the history of novel disseisin is more compatible with the hy-
34. The writ started a case in the lord's court, not the king's court; the action is centered 
more on the possession in 1135 than on the violent ejection; the violent ejection was done not 
to the claimant, but to the claimant's mother. Everything would indicate that this was a case 
which later would have been handled by a writ of right, not a writ of novel disseisin. 
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pothesis proposed here than with Milsom's argument. The intent be-
hind the assize was related to property right. 
Donald Sutherland, on the basis of earlier comments by Milsom, 
has already convincingly argued against a solely regulatory nature 
for the assize.35 Sutherland will agree that lords were the largest but 
not the only class of foreseen defendants. On the one hand, the writ 
was framed very broadly so as not to exclude other defendants. On 
the other hand, in Henry H's world lordship was extremely varied. 
Some lords would have been incapable of protecting their tenants 
against outsiders; others might not have cared to do so. Incapacity 
may have been common with lesser lords, and many lords must have 
had difficulty exercising power in areas where they had few tenants. 
Likewise, in some situations most lords would have hesitated, the 
prime example being the one posed by the hypothesis about the com-
promise of 1153: the lord confronted by a disseisin of an accepted 
tenant by one who had a future claim against him. 
No one, then, would have assumed that lords were the only par-
ties capable of successfully disseising tenants. Both the broadly 
framed writ and the reality of lordship argue for an intent to do 
more than regulate lords. 
Other arguments can be made against a solely regulatory intent 
behind the assize. Milsom acknowledges that disseisins had been the 
subject of criminal inquiries.36 Such inquiries would almost surely 
have included outsiders; and the final civil process would probably 
have been intended to include them also. Moreover, while Milsom 
argues by analogy to the assize of mort d'ancestor, his argument 
from the Assize of Northampton seems overstated.37 The Assize says 
only that such a recognition (an assize of mort d'ancestor) will be 
held if the lord denies seisin to the heirs. One situation in which a 
lord would deny seisin was that in which he was physically incapable 
of delivering it. Thus neither the Assize of Northampton nor the 
writ of mort d'ancestor says that the lord was the only foreseen de-
fendant. To fashion an effective remedy, the designers of both novel 
disseisin and mort d'ancestor had to take into account not only will-
ful lords but also impotent lords and assertive and strong third par-
ties. Finally, if novel disseisin was meant also for the king's tenants 
- and it probably was - it would be that lord's method of perform-
ing his duties to tenants who had indeed been ejected by third par-
35. D. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DJSSEISIN 30-31 (1973). Milsom does not 
treat this part of Sutherland's work. 
36. P. 178. 
37. P. 166. 
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ties. The form of the writ does not show that the assize was intended 
only to supervise lord's courts. 
The definition of the purpose of the assize is dependent on the 
dating of the origins of the assize as a civil procedure. He seems to 
suppose that early mentions of the assize refer only to a criminal 
procedure, with the civil procedure being formulated after the assize 
of mort d'ancestor, that is, after 1176.38 If novel disseisin was that 
recent an innovation for Glanvill, the assize really would have been 
changing the law only in the first rolls, as Milsom maintains. But 
Sutherland has challenged that dating for the assize, showing that 
there is no evidence of a criminal variety of novel disseisin after 
1168, and that a civil procedure coexisted with the criminal proce-
dure for at least a time before that. Sutherland believes there was a 
definitive assize ordinance very early in Henry II's reign, and at the 
latest by 1166.39 Since the evidence requires only minor modifica-
tions in Sutherland's dating, Milsom's assumption seems difficult to 
maintain. 
Writs of protection and writs of confirmation constitute an essen-
tial background to the assize of novel disseisin. In December 1154, 
just prior to Henry H's departure for England to claim his throne, he 
issued a writ of protection to Savigny Abbey in Normandy. That 
writ required speedy remedy for evictions committed within a short 
period of limitation, and the remedy had "criminal" overtones.40 A 
similar protection was given to Reading Abbey in England by the 
Empress Matilda between 1159 and 1160.41 These protections would 
set in motion remedies containing the essential elements of novel dis-
seisin, even though they were not general remedies and a recognition 
procedure need not have been used. Likewise, there was already 
something special about free fees. When Henry II confirmed Wil-
liam de Vescy's tenures --from whomever they were held - he con-
firmed them with "all their liberties which pertain to a free fee."42 
38. Milsom, Introduction to 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW at xxxix (2d ed. reissued 1968). Milsom seems to maintain the same view in Legal Frame-
work. Seep. 178. 
39. D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at 6-14. 
40. See 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGLO-NORMANNORUM, 1066-1154, supra note 17, at 299 
(No. 813). The writ extended Henry H's personal protection to the abbey, its monks, its prop-
erty, and its men; it forbade his barons and justices to allow the monks to be impleaded of 
anything of which they were seised on the day he passed over to England; it ordered them to 
do full and speedy justice to anyone who contravened his order as against one who had ef-
fronted the king himself. 
41. See iti. at 261-62 (No. 711). This protection was limited to those things of which the 
abbey was seised when Henry crossed over into Normandy and was to last until Henry re-
turned to England. 
42. Id at 332 (No. 912). 
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Part of that "liberty" might have been a royal assurance of the pro-
tection a lord should provide. Henry II was not reluctant to interfere 
in the relationships between lords and their men; he could provide 
the protection they were unable to or he could see to it that their 
mutual obligations were kept. Such writs are the conceptual back-
ground for early novel disseisin. 
Henry's early disseisin edicts show his desire to supervise actions 
pursuant to the compromise of 1153. When he was in England, of 
course, no edict would be necessary; he could settle matters by per-
sonal intervention. When preparing to leave the realm, however, he 
put a temporary halt to such actions by edict. Three writs, appar-
ently from 1162, authorize exceptions to that assize: they order the 
situation to be put back as it had been in 1135. One concerned the 
definition of a tenement;43 another, tithes which had been sub-
tracted;44 the third, lands which had been occupied.45 The earliest 
such edict which can be documented-from either 1155 or 1158 -
was indeed a protection issued in advance of a departure from the 
realm for a limited duration and of a general nature. 46 The concern 
was clearly to stabilize matters in his absence. The result would be 
to accustom people to legal remedies.47 
It is difficult to show that the edicts were directed also to preserv-
ing accepted tenants' seisin from claimants with right. The cases, 
however, are conformable to that hypothesis. Moreover, cases from 
the plea rolls around 1200 reveal individuals who in fact waited until 
the current accepted tenant died before asserting their right, imply-
43. R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 22, 423-24 (Writ No. 23). 
44. ST. BENET OF HOLME, 1020-1210, supra note 7, at 22 (Writ No. 36). 
45. Id at 23 (Writ No. 39). See D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at 8 n.1. 
46. See I THE LETTERS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 162-63, No. 102 (W. Miller & H. Butler 
eds. 1955); D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at 8. In the translation, it seems pelitorium should 
be translated as "claim" rather than "proprietary suit." The tenant had apparently been force-
fully and violently evicted during the war; the new holder of the fee had his nominee ap-
pointed to the church. The first tenant at some - seemingly much - later time regained his 
fee and seemingly in the first years of Henry II evicted the priest. All this would be in accord 
with the compromise. The Archbishop of Canterbury then threatened the tenant, who had to 
return the priest to his position. He then introduced a claim before the archbishop reciting the 
earlier violent ejection and introduced a royal writ based on the unwilling return of the church 
to the priest, a return forced by the archbishop after the king's departure and against his edict. 
The assize thus worked to preserve in possession those who were newly repossessed pursuant 
to restitution. 
47. John S. Beckerman has provided greater clarity to this issue by splitting the develop-
ment of novel disseisin into parts. Beckerman, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 625-29 (1974). It 
seems clear, however, that the early edicts did indeed refer to recent disseisins. The change 
which came in 1176 was the expression of such a limitation during a time in which the king 
was present in England, implying that such remedies were henceforth not directly under the 
king's supervision. 
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ing that they could not act earlier.48 Finally, only such a hypothesis 
will account both for the feudal mindset in 1153 and for the legal 
consequences by 1200. Novel disseisin was a royal assurance to ac-
cepted tenants of both the king and his magnates, an outgrowth of 
the compromise of 1153. By 1190 it had been around for decades in 
some form, even though the writ in G!anvi!! may have been much 
more recent. 
The dislocation of Milsom's argument that results may be sub-
stantial. Our analysis of tolt, the compromise of 1153, and now the 
origins of the assize of novel disseisin leads to the hypothesis that 
early in the reign of Henry II there already was a form of property 
right - royal assurance, something far short of ownership - which 
was not solely the feudal obligation of the lord to his tenant. The 
early distinction between seisin and right and the royal assurance 
and protection of both require a modification of Milsom's chronol-
ogy. A truly feudal world could no longer exist in the presence of 
such a royal assurance. The compromise of 1153 must have inaugu-
rated a transitional period, a period initiated not by ideas of sover-
eignty and ownership - the origins Milsom opposes - but by a 
dual protection of the conflicting claims of seisin and right. In doing 
this Henry II had to be concerned not only with supervising lords 
and their courts, but also with justicing his own tenants and the ten-
ants of impotent lords. There is thus a royal element in addition to 
Milsom's feudal component. The property right resulting from the 
compromise of 1153 was progressively strengthened by the assize of 
mort d'ancestor and then by the bureaucratization of the law. That 
bureaucratization, which Milsom does not emphasize, applied the 
protection of the writs to a much wider segment of society in a more 
regular form. Milsom rightly observes the decline of customary dis-
cretion around 1200, but customary discretion had been progres-
sively modified since 1153. Although the result was a realized 
property right in the early decades of the thirteenth century, the 
changes around 1200 could be neither as sudden nor as radical as 
Milsom maintains. The ground had already been well prepared. 
IV 
The real beauty of Milsom's thesis is that it is so cohesive; every 
part of the argument seems to necessitate every other part. The ma-
jor objection to the hypothesis above is thus his analysis of the writs 
of entry. Milsom's explanation of the origins of those writs is quite 
48. See note 76 infra; l ROTULI CURIAE REGIS 93 (F. Palgrave ed. 1835). 
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clear. They began, he asserts, with downward-looking quo warranto 
type claims by lords in their own courts; the requirement of a writ 
anomalously brought them into the king's court; there the issue -
on a writ of right or a precipe - was sorted out first by a special 
mise, later by a special inquest on the issue of the entry. Finally, and 
this he qualifies with a "perhaps," the entry words were regularly 
inserted into the original writ itself as one consequence of Magna 
Carta.49 The late insertion of the words of entry into the original 
writ, the seignorial overtones to the word "entry," and the down-
ward-looking orientation of these actions all buttress the idea that 
England around 1200 was still very feudal and. that tenants in 1200 
were only beginning to gain any kind of property right. This expla-
nation greatly clarifies methods of analysis,50 and many of Milsom's 
conclusions are valid. Nevertheless, it must be maintained that there 
were writs of entry before 1215, that the word "entry" also had 
"ownership" overtones, and that some of the writs of entry were up-
ward-looking. In short, the origins of the writs of entry are more 
varied than Milsom supposes; these writs demand a less feudal world 
than he saw. 
Many of these conclusions could be drawn solely from the writ of 
entry sur disseisin, which was made a writ of course in 1204. While 
G.D.G. Hall has indeed shown that this writ should not play a large 
part in the discussion of the first writs of entry,51 it is perplexing that 
Milsom accords it no role at all.52 The writ of entry sur disseisin is 
important in two ways. First, it shows the existence of a writ of entry 
well prior to Magna Carta and thus must fortify the possibility that 
there were other early forms of entry writs. Likewise, the writ was 
originally available only when an assize of novel disseisin would 
otherwise fail because of the death of the plaintiff while the assize 
was pending. That shows that the writ sur disseisin grew out of the 
assize of novel disseisin and not from a writ of right patent. The 
writ's classical orientation is thus upward-looking and not down-
ward-looking. And that upward-looking orientation must cast some 
doubt on the exclusively seignorial overtones which Milsom attrib-
49. Pp. 93-101, 158. 
50. It should be noted specifically that Milsom has shown the kinds of issues which could 
be concealed in a grand assize, the seignorial overtones to the word "entry," the possibility of 
writs of entry growing out of the writ patent, and the difficulty of using the plea rolls to estab-
lish the forms of writs. I am contesting none of this, only asserting that there are additional 
sources and other aspects which must be considered. 
51. Hall, The Early History of Entry sur JJisseisin, 4~ TuL. L. REV. 584 (1968). 
52. Milsoi:n simply excluded this writ from his discussion. P. 95. This treatment is strange 
because his mention of sur disseisin is followed by an assertion that writs of entry have a "pre-
natal history" in the writs of right, whereas sur disseisin is so clearly related to the assize. 
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utes to the word "entry." Here it is the tenant asking his lord how he 
entered, a demand which must resemble more the demand of an 
owner against a stranger rather than that of a lord against his tenant. 
Of course, assertions made on the basis of entry sur disseisin alone 
would remain very weak. Fortunately, however, the hints provided 
by that writ can be proved otherwise. 
The forms of writs can at times be ascertained from the Rotuli de 
Oblatis et Finibus, which records payments made for writs prior to 
the time of pleading. This source is thus not subject to the difficulties 
Milsom has shown in the plea rolls, and it shows the existence of 
writs of entry prior to 1215. In 1213 a writ of entry cui in vita was 
purchased for three palfreys;53 the case was pleaded in 1214.54 In 
1207 the abbess of Caen paid one mark for a writ of entry ad 
terminum qui preteriit.55 In 1206 Geoffrey son of Richard gave 
twenty shillings for a writ of entry after a tortious feoffment made by 
a guardian.56 In 1205 William of Albemun gave one half mark for a 
similar writ, 57 which has been regarded as entry sur disseisin but is 
clearly centered on the feoffment by the guardian. 58 There were thus 
at least four kinds of writs of entry prior to Magna Carta, although 
there is no way now to determine the frequency of their use. What is 
certain is that Magna Carta could only have had a very limited im-
53. Matillidis de Candos dat tres palefridos pro habendo quodam precipe coram domino 
rege in crastino Sancti Nicholai de feodo dimidii militis cum pertinenciis in Hild' quod 
clamat esse jus et hereditatem suam versus Radulfum Morin juniorem in quod non habet 
ingressum nisi per Philippum de Columbariis quondam virum ipsius Matillidis qui eidem 
Radulfo feodum illud dedit cui ipsa Matillidis in vita sua contradicere non potuit. Habet 
precipe, et preceptum [est] vicecomiti quod ab eadem Matillide securitatem capiat de 
predictis tribus palefridis ad opus domini regis pro brevi illo. Teste Willelmo Briwerr' 
apud Wodestok iiij die Novembris. Coram domino Wint' episcopo. Per S. comitem Win-
ton. 
R0TULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 502. 
54. 7 CURIA REGIS ROLLS OF THE REIGNS OF RICHARD I. AND JOHN, PRESERVED IN THE 
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 85 (1935) [hereinafter cited as CURIA REGIS ROLLS]. 
55. pro habendo quodam precipe ut Radulfus de Veyn juste et sine dilacione reddat ei j 
messuagium cum pertinenciis in Pendeb' in quod idem Radulfus non habet ingressum nisi 
per Thomam de Veyn fratrem suum cui ipsa illud dimisit ad firmam ad terminum qui 
preteriit ut dicit et nisi fecerit quod sit coramjusticiariis domini regis apud Westmonaster-
ium ab octabis sancti Johannis Baptiste in tres septimanas ostensurus quare non fecerit. 
R0TULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 378. 
56. _pro habendo quodam precipe coram justiciariis domini regis apud Westmonaster-
ium m octabis sancti Hilari1 inter ipsum et Henricum Ruffum de j carrucata terre cum 
pertinenciis in Pilesde in quam non habuit ingressum nisi per canonicos de Messenden 
qui in earn nullum habuerunt ingressum nisi per Willelmum filium Gaufridi qui earn 
habuit in custodiam ut dicitur. 
Id. at 340. 
51. Id. at 334. 
58. See Hall, supra note 51, at 588-89. Hall notes that the writ did not have the limitaton 
clause, which makes it a strange candidate for sur disseisin. Classifying it as per guardian 
strengthens Hall's conclusions about infrequency of the use of sur disseisin. ~ 
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pact here. With the so-calledprecpe writ of right Magna Carta initi-
ated really new forms of writs, writs which included a jurisdictional 
explanation. With the writs of entry Magna Carta would at most 
only have further encouraged their use. Even the serious reader 
might have thought that Milsom was hinting at a more important 
role for Magna Carta, although it is barely possible he was not. 59 
Investigation of the origins of the writs of entry should center on 
their early forms, particularly on entry ad terminum qui preteriit and 
entry after a feoffment by a guardian. Milsom's argument for the 
relationship between the early writs of entry and the writ of right 
patent finds its best evidence in cases concerning entry cui ante 
divorcium 60 and non compos mentis,61 writs which were not formu-
lated until after the middle of the thirteenth century. When he treats 
entry ad terminum qui preteriit, however, he does not seek to trace its 
history from Glanvill, but only to show the difficulty of inferring the 
form of the writ from the plea roll entry.62 He does not even go that 
far with the problem of the guardian's feoffment. A more rigorous 
examination is needed. 
It is highly improbable that entry ad terminum qui preteriit could 
be a derivative of the writ of right patent in the way Milsom's theory 
would suggest. For Milsom to be correct novel disseisin or, at least, 
the writ rule would have had to prevent one from ejecting a creditor 
from the gage (security) he claimed as fee. But no matter how we 
structure the dispute, both the assize and the writ rule seem irrele-
vant to entry ad terminum qui preteriit. Novel disseisin did not pro-
tect a creditor. The creditor did have a kind of seisin; G!anvill 
describes it tentatively as "qua/em qua/em seisinam. " 63 But that sei-
sin was not one which the assize protected. A creditor ousted from 
his gage could not recover the gage; he was advised to proceed 
59. See, e.g., p. 102, where Milsom specifies that he is talking about proliferation of the 
writs, and p. 158, where he talks about the Magna Carta encouraging incorporation of the 
entry clause into the writ. But in light of his comments concerning assumptions that the writs 
of entry were early, p. 101, it is unclear whether his other comments are to be taken as refer-
ring to the proliferation of kinds of writs of entry or to the use of.individual writs already 
occasionally used. The former seems to be what he is saying, in which case his interpretation 
can be questioned. 
60. See pp. 45-47, 92-94. This case established his first stage quo worronto inquiry and the 
action of novel disseisin: the Countess Amiee case. 
61. See pp. 95-96. This is the case in which he found the statement "tolisjuroto non so/et 
fteri nisi emersisset de hrevi de recto. " The temptation, of course, is to extend that statement to 
all issues using entry words, but it should not be taken to apply to anything except non compos 
mentis situations. 
- 62. See pp. 98-99. 
63. See GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 153-56 (Writ No. XIII, 11). 
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against the debtor for his debt.64 A debtor who had gaged only part 
of his holding would probably be sufficiently powerful to oust the 
creditor himself, unless the creditor was his lord. If the creditor was 
his lord, however, the orientation of this writ of entry would be up-
ward-looking. If the creditor had gaged his entire tenement, it is 
likely that he would have gone to his lord for assistance; the lord 
would probably have been consulted about the gage originally any-
way, since it would endanger the services. No writ should have been 
needed; the land was not a free tenement. If a writ were needed, the 
lord should have been ready and willing to eject the creditor. Mil-
som's theory therefore does not seem capable of explaining the ori-
gins of entry ad terminum qui preteriit. 
Entry ad terminum qui preteriit found its origins in the writ of 
gage, not in the writ of right patent. The gage writ in G!anvill is very 
close to a writ of entry, although it does not use entry words.65 That 
writ has long been viewed as the forerunner of entry ad terminum qui 
preteriit, but Milsom omits it from consideration. By the time of 
G!anvill, however, there was already an alternative to the old form of 
trial prescribed by the process pursuant to that writ: a new recogni-
tion on the special issue of whether the defendant held as gage or as 
fee. That recognition is related to the assize utrum - which it fol-
lows immediately in G!anvi!l - in that it puts alternative tenures to 
the jury.66 Maitland declined to call this recognition an assize, but it 
is called an assize in the early plea rolls. 67 The writ of entry was 
produced when the content of the recognition was inserted into the 
64. See GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 126 (Writ No. X, 11); 2 ROTULI CURIAE REGIS, supra 
note 48, at 215, 247; THREE ROLLS OF THE KING'S COURT IN THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD 
THE FIRST, A.O. 1194-1195, at 67 (1891) (Pub. No. 14 of the Pipe Roll Socy.) [hereinafter cited 
as THREE ROLLS OF THE KING'S COURT]. 
65. The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command N. to restore, justly and without delay, 
so much land in such-and-such a vill to R., who gaged it to him for a hundred marks until 
the end of a term which is now past, as R. says; and to accept payment from him. If he 
does not do so, summon him by good summoners to be before me or my justices at a 
certain place to show why he has not done so. And have there the summoners and this 
writ. Witness etc." 
GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 126 (Writ No. X, 9) (translation altered). 
66. See GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 164-65. (Writ Nos. XIII, 26-27). 
67. See F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 32 (A. Chaytor & w. 
Whittaker eds. 1968); THREE ROLLS OF THE KING'S COURT, supra note 64, at 66-67, 73-74, 
135; 1 ROTULI CURIAE REGIS, supra note 48, at 361; 2 id at 211; 1 CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra 
note 54, at 158,220, 245 (1922). Note that 2 RoTULI CURIAE REGIS, supra note 48, at 137, 218, 
might be a transitional writ. One cannot be sure whether it is an altered writ of gage, a writ of 
right, or a writ of entry. The issue goes to a fee or gage assize after a proffer. The proffer here 
could have been for the entry words, but it may also have been for the specification of the time 
of Henry II. The latter would seem more probable. The assize was asked about the gage 
having been gaged in the reign of Henry II, and about whether the creditor had any other 
entry or right than by gage. 
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original writ. This would be a relatively straightforward procedure 
with some relationship to assizes and no need for legal anomaly, spe-
cial mises, or particularly late origins. 
Another situation which Milsom's theories cannot easily explain 
is that embodied in the writ of entry related to a guardian's feoff-
ment. Here G!anvi!! contains another utrum style special recogni-
tion, but it derives from the assize ofmort d'ancestor. At the time of 
G!anvi!! the recognition was perhaps used only to inquire whether a 
minor tenant's father died seised as of fee or as ofwardship.68 While 
this was also called an assize, it was an assize which could sound in 
the right, because a claimant w:1J.o lost here had no further remedy. 
This assize recognition would seem also to be the origin of a writ of 
entry. 
Cases show this writ of entry developing out of mort d'ancestor 
with a distinctly upward-looking orientation. Sarnebroc v. Broy was 
initiated by a payment for an inquisition framed in entry words;69 
the case appeared in the rolls twice in 1200, the latter time as an 
assize to recognize if the vouchee's father had other entry than by 
custody of the claimant's father.70 This is a tenant claiming against 
his lord, an upward-looking plea framed in entry words. Similarly, 
Bodham v. Trave!eg, while perhaps downward-looking, was closely 
related to mort d'ancestor.71 In Fitz Robert v. Whitewe!!, the assize 
answered the two mort d'ancestor questions and then also whether 
the claimant's lord had disseised him while he was in wardship.72 
This enrollment of the pleading with entry words in 1201 is the kind 
68. See GLANVILL, supra note II, at I 142-43 (Writ Nos. XIII, 13-14). 
69. "Henry de Semebroc gives to the lord king 100s for having a recognition concerning 
the inquisition of the mill of Semebroc: whether Walter de Broi had other entry of the 
abovesaid mill than by custody." RoTULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 5. There is no other 
recorded initiation for the case; it remains possible that it grew out of an assize of mort 
d'ancestor. 
70. See I CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 54, at I 16, 181. The case should have appeared 
in between those entries in the Easter term, from which no roll is extant. The latter entry: 
"The assize comes to recognize if Walter de Broy, father of Robert de Broy had other entry 
(ingressum) or other right in the mill of Samebroc than by William, father of Henry de 
Samebroc, whom he had in custody with all his land and with the abovesaid mill while he was 
under age, and if the same Henry is nearest heir of the same William .... " This is somewhat 
different from procedure in Glanvill, because the tenant does not seem to be underage. 
71. I CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 54, at 123, 125. The case concerned the questions of 
whether claimant's father had died seised in demesne as of fee, and whether tenant's entry 
(fngressum) was only through his wife, daughter of claimant's older brother, who had prede-
ceased his father without ever having had seisin. It would result in an order to deliver seisin if 
the claimant should win. See GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 158-59 (Writ No. XIII, 15). This was 
not, strictly speaking, a guardian case. 
72. See ROTULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 58; THE GREAT ROLLS OF THE PIPE FOR 
THE SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING JOHN, MICHAELMAS 1200 {PIPE ROLL 46), at 169 
(D. Stenton ed. 1934) (Pipe Roll Socy. Pub. No. 50, new ser. vol 12). 
April 1981] Milsom's Legal Framework 1159 
that Milsom carefully shows could derive from the writ of right pat-
ent; here, however, it developed from a mort d'ancestor variant.73 
From this point it is easy to see how the special inquest could be cut 
off from the assize and modelled on the gage writ turned writ of 
entry, resulting in the earlier mentioned upward-looking writ of en-
try found in 1205 and 1206. 74 Milsom was thus correct in thinking 
that the writs of entry derived from special inquests, but those spe-
cial inquests could derive not only from the writ of right patent, but 
also from the writ of gage and the assize of mort d'ancestor. 
Even when Milsom's logic concerning the restriction of lord's ac-
tions works well - and it often does - the result is not necessarily a 
writ patent removed into the king's court. Fitz Robert v. Stutevill is 
an instance in which the lord was acting for his underage claimant. 
The lord was apparently unable or unwilling to take action in his 
own court, so he initiated the litigation by procuring an assize recog-
nition'with entry words, a recognition similar to entry by intrusion.75 
The process Milsom envisages could thus be telescoped into what 
was called an assize, and the assize would be the forerunner of a writ 
of entry. 
While the process of identifying original writs - whether it was a 
writ of entry or a writ of right - is at times more simple than Mil-
som maintains, it is at times even more difficult. Pirun v. Pirun 76 was 
73. As the right (of the claimant), in which they do not have entry unless by Elias the 
late husband of the same Alice (a tenant), father of the abovesaid Matilda and Roesia, 
who had that land in custody .... (And they say) that one of them is underage and she 
seeks her age. And Adam (claimant) says that he ought not await her age, because they 
did not have entry unless by custody as has been said .... Judgment: let not her age be 
awaited but let there be a jury whether the father of the abovesaid had other entry into 
that land than as has been said above and if the three tenants had other entry than by the 
same father. 
l CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 54, at 419. For earlier process (which, however, is after the 
payment of 1200) see l PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, 1198-1202, at 331, 345 (D. 
Stenton ed. 1953) (Selden Socy. Pub. No. 67) (Plea Nos. 3325, 3439). 
74. See text at notes 56-58 supra. 
75. See ROTULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 61; THE GREAT ROLL OF THE PIPE FOR THE 
FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING JOHN, MICHAELMAS 1199 (PIPE ROLL 45), at 252 (D. 
Stenton ed. 1933) (Pipe Roll Socy. Pub. No. 48, new series vol. 10) (payment for a recognition 
with entry words); l CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 54, at 288 (enrollment beginning "The 
jury comes to recognize whether (tenants) had other entry"); id. at 335 (the plea is called 
simply an assize of land). 
76. Cecilia daughter of Isabel gives the lord king 24 marks of silver for having right 
against Hamo Pirun and Peter Pirun concerning a knight's fee with appurtenances in 
Saunderton. And it was ordered to the sheriff of Buckinghamshire that he order the 
abovesaid Hamo and Peter that justly and without delay they return to the abovesaid 
Cecilia the abovesaid fee, whereof Henry Pirun father of the abovesaid Hamo . . . who 
holds that land did not have that land if not in custody after the death of the abovesaid 
Isabel his wife whose heir she (is) as she says, and unless they do and if she make the 
sheriff secure concerning prosecuting her claim, then let him summon them that they be at 
Westminster on the quindene of Easter to show why they do not. And she will pay the 
abovesaid 24 marks when she shall have had right concerning the abovesaid fee. 
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certainly begun by a precipe with entry words, essentially a writ of 
entry by intrusion after a tenant in curtesy. The payment for the writ 
might at first have led one to think it was a writ of right (''pro 
habendo recto"). And the claimant actually referred to it as a breve 
de recto in comparing it to a writ of mort d'ancestor. Similarly, the 
clerk who entered the payment inAmundevi!l v. Amundevi!l11 did not 
at first shrink from talking about a writ of right with entry words; 
perhaps it was his supervisor who made him revise his enrollment. 
Perhaps, then, we must even doubt marginations which say ''per 
breve de recto." This conclusion, however, is only cautionary; it 
seems that it would be incorrect to conclude that Milsom's argu-
ments from such marginations are therefore wrong. 
There are thus some flaws in Milsom's treatment of the writs of 
entry. He did not relate them to G!anvill, nor did he use the Rotuli de 
Oblatis and the pipe rolls. Had he done so, he would have been 
forced to conclude that the writs of entry developed earlier than he 
implied and that they were related as much to assize recognitions as 
to writs of right patent. The major problem with Milsom's analysis, 
however, is that the writs of entry could be either upward-looking or 
downward-looking. Had they been only downward-looking, their 
RoTULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 48 (reviewer's translation). 
Cecilia de Pirun owes 24 marks (for having) an inquisition concerning a knight's fee in 
Saunderton and concerning 40 shillings worth of land in Wallingford: whether Henry 
father of the same Cecilia had other right or other entry [reading "ingressum" instead of 
"transgressum"] in that land than by Isabel mother of that Cecilia whose inheritance that 
land was and whose heir the same Cecilia is. 
THE GREAT ROLL OF THE PIPE FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING JOHN, 
MICHELMAS 1200 at 265 (reviewer's translation). See also I CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 
54, at 173, 225. 
The case is probably unrelated to the former plea of THREE ROLLS OF THE KING'S COURT, 
supra note 64, at 9, a previous plea between the same parties for the same land, based on a 
claim to reverse the result of a (feudal?) felony in Stephen's reign: an excellent example of the 
working of the compromise of 1153. Following his line of argument on p. 70, Milsom might 
argue that theprecipe here is functioning like a pone, but I am unconvinced by his references 
that that was even an acceptable, let alone normal, use of the precipe. 
77. Alice de Amundevill gives to the lord king 20 marks of silver for having a writ of 
right concerning a fee of a half knight with appurtenances in Wiminthorp or let him have 
escambium to the value, in which fee Jollanus did not have entry except by the same 
Alice, so that the plea be before justices at Westminster at three weeks Easter. 
ROTULI DE OBLATIS, supra note 27, at 55 (cancelled). 
Alice daughter of Elias de Amundevill gives the lord king 20 marks for having a recog-
nition whether Elias her father gave to her the vill of Winterton [sic] to marry herself so 
that she was seised thereof while her father lived and after the death of her father until 
Jollanus the brother of the same Alice disseised her thereof while she was in his custody. 
Id. at 63 (reviewer's translation). See also I CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 54, at 309, 317. 
These are two enrollments of the same appearance, one with entry words seemingly in the 
writ or count, one with entry words only in the issue. Since the issue was already foreseen in 
the proffer prior to pleading, however, it makes little difference whether the word "entry" was 
in the writ; the incorporation of the special issue into the writ would be a transfer from a 
record of a statement usually made at the purchase of the writ and entered in the rolls into the 
writ itself. 
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form would have greatly reinforced Milsom's argument that En-
gland around 1200 was still very feudal indeed and did not yet have 
a conception of property right. The emergence of the word "entry" 
in the plea rolls around 1200 would thus have indicated that lords 
for the first time had to resort to the king's court in making down-
ward claims: prior to that, they had had absolute control. But we 
have seen that lords had to resort to the king before 1200.78 Since 
writs of entry could also be upward-looking, and since the earliest 
growth was with entry ad terminum qui preteriit and entry after a 
guardian's feoffment - writs difficult to fit into Milsom's theory - a 
better explanation is required. The word "entry," while it did have 
some seignorial overtones, embodied a new idea of property right 
which had been growing ever since the compromise of 1153 necessi-
tated the protection of both seisin and the expectancy which was 
right. 
V 
The final major line of argument which supports Milsom's con-
tention that England in 1200 was still very feudal is that related to 
warranty. He maintains that in a lord's court the obligation of war-
ranty would necessitate an automatic default so that any dispute be-
tween an outside claimant and an accepted tenant would always 
come before the county court by tolt. In the king's court, an action 
for warranty would thus naturally result in an order to the lord's 
court to default, since that default was part of the customary order of 
things and thus a tenant's right and a lord's duty. The lord's court 
was immovably biased, and the king's court would keep it that way. 
After reading Milsom's argument, no one is going to maintain that 
lords' courts were impartial tribunals of justice. Nevertheless, if 
there was an idea of property right earlier than he suggests, his vision 
of the consequences of warranty is rather strange. 
In the realm of feudal theory, the lord might indeed entertain a 
plea from an outside claimant, ·either gratuitously from a sense of 
moral obligation or reluctantly after some outside influence. Many 
lords would have vacant positions. Instead of rejecting one who had 
some claim against him and thus appearing an unfaithful lord, he 
might well find it preferable to submit the matter to his court. If by 
judgment he found himself obligated to two persons, the one with 
more right would receive the land; the other would receive compen-
78. See text at notes 28 & 32 supra. 
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sation - escambium -perhaps in the form of an heiress. No feu-
dal logic absolutely required the rejection of a claimant. 
There are only two pieces of evidence to support the contention 
that a lord might indeed entertain such a plea. I am unable to pro-
duce a case in which there was a proprietary inter-party suit in a 
lord's court; but, then, records are scarce. The form of the writ pat-
ent, however, mentions a deforciant, and if no one thought the lord 
could hold right to the claimant, the writ was only a fiction - a 
notification that there was a claim against him. A better way could 
easily have been found to notify the lord. Likewise, G/anvi/1 contains 
a writ of peace for prohibiting a lord from continuing further in a 
case between a claimant and a tenant. It assumes there has already 
been a count and that the tenant has made his mise to the grand 
assize properly in the lord's court. It is also conditioned by the possi-
bility that the lord had already put the matter to trial by battle.79 
Milsom does not consider that writ. But if he is right, such a writ 
would never have been used. A lord's court thus must have heard an 
outside claimant's plea, at least at times. 
If a lord could hear such a plea, the action of warranty could not 
result in an order to a lord's court to default. Milsom's evidence for 
such orders is not convincing.80 Until better evidence is presented-
and Milsom himself was somewhat hesitant on this assertion - it is 
better to believe that a lord would be allowed to hold right to a 
claimant even against a sitting tenant, as long as the lord then ful-
filled his obligations to that tenant. A lord's court may not in fact 
often have been impartial, but it would not be denied the opportu-
nity to be so. 
79. The king to the sheriff, greeting. Prohibit N., unless battle has already been 
waged, from holding in his court the plea between R. and M. concerning one hide of land 
in such-and-such a viii, which the said R. is claiming against the aforesaid M. by my writ; 
because M., who is tenant, puts himself upon my assize and seeks a recognition to deter-
mine which of them has the greater right in the land. Witness, etc. 
GLANVILL, supra note 6, at 29 (Writ No. II, 8). This writ shows that this does indeed concern a 
lord's court and not something like a court of the king's demesne. It was proper for the tenant 
to put himself on the grand assize in the lower court and for the lower court to judge concern-
ing its form; only then would the writ of peace be issued. 
80. See pp. 63-64 nn. 1-2. Milsom relies on two cases. The first, the 1221 case, did result in 
an order to the lord's court not to hear the plea. But the situation may well have been that the 
tenant had not yet been accepted by the lord. Since he had a deed - perhaps made out to his 
ancestor - he chose to make the lord abide by the deed by action of warranty before being 
made to answer to an outside claimant by writ of right. The prohibition merely prohibited 
these two suits from being held simultaneously. The second, the 1207 case, mentioned merely 
as a possibility in a footnote, seems to have been a similar situation. The king's court could 
rightly worry about simultaneous pleas. Issues should be determined in their proper order, 
and the court in which a plea is first initiated could well have claimed priority in resolving the 
matter. 
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VI 
The hypothesis here suggested is based on Milsom's conceptions, 
but it supposes both a different world around 1200 and different 
forces which produced the common law. Prior to 1153 any interven-
tion to break a bond beween lord and man must have been very 
exceptional; intervention would have been intended to restore or ini-
tiate such a relationship when there was no impediment. The com-
promise of 1153, which here takes on crucial significance, was 
framed according to that kind of morality. Simple transgressors 
were of course to be put out; disinherited tenants were to be restored 
when there was no impediment. When there was an impeding ac-
cepted tenant, however, he had to be maintained until he died, with 
the hereditary claimant, not the tenant's heir, succeeding. Lords put 
in such a situation would have wanted a manifestation of outside 
intervention - a writ - to warrant the refusal of the tenant's heir. 
The compromise originated, in this way, the distinction between sei-
sin and right. The current tenant had seisin, the physical embodi-
ment of the lord's acceptance and all the title a really feudal world 
knew. The hereditary claimant had right, a royally instituted and 
protected expectancy. Both had to be protected; the one by the early 
processes of novel disseisin, the other by the writs of right. 
Over the next half century the royal assurance evolved into a 
genuine property right. Novel disseisin would surely soon have been 
used to protect also one who had successfully asserted his right. And 
seisin and right came to be seen not as conflicting but as related 
rights. Glanvill tried to fit the writs into a scheme of possessory and 
proprietary remedies. Before 1176, then, seignorial discretion had 
already been limited. The greater judicial activity in and after 1176 
then struck far deeper into the social fabric. That undertaking cre-
ated rules oflaw that slowly eliminated seignorial discretion through 
the regularized availability of remedies not wholly conceived on a 
feudal model. This wider application of the law furthered the rights 
of tenants; their property right found some conceptualization, still 
mixed with feudal notions, in the writs of entry. At least part of the 
explanation of John's reign lies in the preservation of seignorial dis-
cretion at the highest level, but now having to be defined and pro-
tected against growing notions of ownership. Finally, Magna Carta 
sought to end that survival of royal discretion, by making the king 
"treat his own men as his law already [made] them treat theirs" (p. 
25). 
This Review has been extraordinarily long, because it seeks to 
put into discussion the pioneering ideas which Milsom has 
1164 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 79:1130 
presented. He has assuredly accomplished one of his goals: showing 
that his questions have a legitimate place. But he has done much 
more. Much of what he says must be accepted. Moreover, his un-
derstanding of the workings of early law, even if - as maintained 
here - parts of his argument are faulty, must be the starting point 
for further research on the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
Maitland's framework will no longer suffice; the answers do lie in the 
direction Milsom suggests. A Review like this necessarily focuses on 
criticism, but that will not take the measure of the book. The impor-
tance of Legal Framework is not that it is definitive. It is not. It is, 
rather, a seminal work of the highest order for those concerned with 
the legal and social origins of Anglo-American law. 
